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Bhagwati hypothesis opines that the overall impact of foreign direct investment (FDI) on 
economic growth is conditioned on countries’ level of integration with the international market. 
We test this hypothesis for some selected countries in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Does this 
hypothesis hold given our sample evidence? Yes! No! Maybe! We explain why. By invoking the 
sample splitting and threshold estimation technique, we find that the two measures of openness 
(trade openness and exports) mediate the FDI-economic growth relationship in three countries 
and this is an indication of complete Bhagwati hypothesis in these countries. Also, we find that, 
given the measure of openness, four countries exhibit incomplete Bhagwati hypothesis. Finally, 
we find no support for the Bhagwati hypothesis for most countries. Based on these findings, we 
argue that the validity of the Bhagwati hypothesis may be contingent on both country 
characteristics and the indicator of openness. 
Keywords: FDI; Economic Growth; Trade Openness; Exports; Threshold 
1.0 Introduction 
Achieving high economic growth is the paramount objective of governments all over the world 
as it improves the standard of living of their citizens. Openness of the economy (to both trade 
and inflows of capital) is upheld as one of very important contributing factors of economic 
growth, particularly in developing countries. The World Bank, International Monetary Fund and 
World Trade Organization support the notion that openness is good for growth. The formation of 
the World Trade Organization and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) are at 
the forefront of ensuring that fair rules apply on the playing grounds for the flows of goods, 
services and capital. MIGA is particularly interested in moderating capital inflows into 
developing countries, and its impact in Africa has been substantial (MIGA, 2015). Trade and 
foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows are largely argued in the literature to improve 
competitiveness of firms, lead to economies of scale, widen markets, increase the impact of 
positive spillovers among others (Zhang, 2001; Liu, Burridge, & Sinclair, 2002; Liu, Shu & 
Sinclair, 2009; Adams & Opoku, 2015; Sakyi, Commodore & Opoku, 2015; Iamsiraroj, 2016).1 
 
                                                 




Extant empirical studies on the impact of trade and FDI have been conducted especially 
following the liberalization of a greater number of African countries in the 1980s (see for 
example, Adams & Opoku, 2015; Soumaré, 2015; Musila, &Yiheyis, 2016; Iamsiraroj, 2016; 
Mahembe& Odhiambo, 2016; Zahonogo, 2016; Zekarias, 2016; Acquah and Ibrahim, 2019; 
Bouchoucha and Yahyaoui, 2019). Most of the earlier studies focused on finding the separate 
impact of trade and FDI on economic growth. However, in the well cited works of Bhagwati 
(1973, 1978), he hypothesized that the overall impact of FDI on economic growth is conditioned 
on countries’ level of integration with the international market. Though he subscribed to the 
potential effect of FDI on economic growth, he argued that the effect of FDI can only be 
actualized based on the how open an economy is to the rest of the world. This has come to be 
known in the literature as the Bhagwati hypothesis. 
About two decades after the inception of the Bhagwati hypothesis, a number of studies started 
testing its efficacy. These studies have largely found validation for the hypothesis. For example, 
the Bhagwati hypothesis has been confirmed by Balasubramanyamet al. (1996) for 18 export 
promotion and 28 import substitution countries, Kohpaiboon (2003) for Thailand, Atiqueet al. 
(2004) for Pakistan, MakkiandSomwaru (2004) for 66 developing countries, Hsiao and Hsiao 
(2006) for 8 developing East and Southeast Asian economies, Hoang et al. (2010) for 61 
provinces in Vietnam. In Africa, not much has been done in testing the Bhagwati hypothesis. 
Some of the remarkable studies that can be cited are Sakyi et al., (2015) who also find validation 
of the hypothesis using data from Ghana using the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) 
approach, and Sakyi and Egyir (2017) for 45 countries in Africa relying on the system 
generalized method of moments (GMM).  
Though the Bhagwati hypothesis has been widely studied, most of these studies have examined 
the hypothesis by interacting FDI and openness in the growth equation where the conditional 
effects are evaluated at the mean, minimum and maximum value of trade (see for instance Sakyi 
et al., 2015; Sakyi &Egyir, 2017). In terms of estimation approach, the existing studies have 
relied on linear approaches which do not reveal how FDI impacts on economic growth given an 
estimated threshold level of openness. Indeed, this study argues that, testing for the validity of 
the Bhagwati hypothesis goes beyond what the linear relationships show. More importantly, an 
appropriate form of testing the hypothesis entails examining how FDI drives countries’ economic 
growth when countries’ level of integration with the international market is below or above an 
estimated threshold of openness. In this endeavour, not only is the precise impact of FDI on 
growth at the different levels documented and the threshold value estimated, the confidence level 
of the threshold is unearthed. However, relying on the techniques are not instructive as they do 
not show the precise FDI-growth nexus when the link is mediated by the level of openness. In 
this study, we re-examine the Bhagwati hypothesis using a sample splitting technique that 
reveals the FDI-growth relationship when openness is either above or below an estimated 
threshold.  
We contribute significantly to the literature in two ways. First, apart from unearthing the 
threshold level of openness where FDI-growth link may change effect, this study estimates the 
precise impact of FDI on economic growth when countries are below and above the threshold 
level of openness. Here, we are able to identify the regimes of openness where FDI inhibits or 
spurs growth. Second, relative to the earlier studies, we deviate from the use of panel data which 
does not consider the different heterogeneous characteristics of each country. More specifically, 
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the study employs times series data for each country and by so doing, we are able to show how 
each country’s level of international integration mediate the relationship between FDI and 
economic growth. We find evidence of the Bhagwati hypothesis in seven countries. However, 
the evidence of the Bhagwati hypothesis is complete (strong) in three countries only while it is 
incomplete (weak) in four countries. Similarly, we find that the Bhagwati hypothesis is absent in 
most of the countries considered for this study. Finally, we observe that, whether the level of 
openness mediates the relationship between FDI and economic growth depends on both the 
country characteristics and the indicator of openness. 
The remainder of this study continues as follows. The next section elaborates on the 
methodology employed, section three presents and discusses the results and the last section 
concludes. 
2.0 Methodology 
2.1 Data and empirical strategy 
We use data from 17 SSA countries. The choice of these countries and the time period as shown 
in Table 1 is based on data availability. Economic growth as the dependent variable is proxied by 
annual GDP growth rate. FDI is the regressor and measured as net FDI inflows as a percentage 
of GDP. We use two measures to denote countries’ international market integration: (i) trade 
openness and (ii) exports as a percentage of GDP. Trade openness is taken as the ratio of the sum 
of countries’ imports and exports to GDP while exports of goods and services represent the value 
of all goods and other market services provided to the rest of the world. This measure has been 
used in recent literature to denote countries’ interaction with global markets (see Ibrahim and 
Sare, 2018; Ibrahim and Alagidede, 2017a,b; 2018; Opoku et al. 2019; Ibrahim, 2018; Aluko and 
Ibrahim, 2020a; Osei et al. 2019). We also include other standard controls of growth notably 
domestic capital proxied by gross fixed capital formation, labour and domestic credit as an 
indicator of financial sector development. All these variables are taken from the World 
Development Indicators (WDI) of the World Bank.  
 
With regard to the empirical strategy, this study relies on Hansen’s (1996, 2000) sample splitting 
approach which utilizes the least square estimation.2 Given the Bhagwati hypothesis, we set up 
equation (1) such that, the impact of FDI on economic growth is conditioned on countries’ level 
of openness. We thus treat openness as the threshold variable with economic growth and FDI as 
the regressand and regressor respectively. In other words, we estimate the following equation: 
 
𝐸𝐶𝑂𝑖 = (𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡)𝑑𝑖(𝑞𝑖 ≤ 𝛾) + (𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑡)𝑑𝑖(𝑞𝑖 > 𝛾) + 𝜀𝑖      (1) 
 
where 𝐸𝐶𝑂𝑖 represents economic growth in country i; 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖is FDI in country i; 𝑞𝑖 is a vector of 
the threshold variables (trade openness and exports) that mediate the link between FDI and 
economic growth;𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑖 is a vector of the control variables;𝛾 is the unknown threshold value of 
openness, while 𝑑𝑖( . ) is the indicator function which is assigned the value of 1 if the condition 
in the indicator function holds and 0 if otherwise; 𝜀𝑖is a noise term while 𝛽𝑖 are the parameters. 
 
We estimate the equation while introducing the openness proxies at a time for cases where we 
find evidence of threshold. To the extent that 𝑞𝑖 is a continuous distribution, how FDI influences 
                                                 
2This approach has also been used recently by Alagidede et al. (2018) and Aluko and Ibrahim (2020b). 
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economic growth depends on 𝛾. We limit 𝛾 to a bounded set [𝛾, 𝛾] = 𝛼 and the least squares 
estimators (?̂?, 𝛾) are determined using the concentration approach where the estimated 𝛾 is the 
value that minimizes sum of the squared residuals [𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑛(𝛾)] and can therefore be stated as: 
𝛾 = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛⏟    
𝛾 ∈ 𝛼
𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑛(𝛾) 
where 𝛼𝑛 = 𝛼 ⋂{𝑔1, 𝑔2, ……… , 𝑔𝑛} while the slope estimators are estimated as ?̂? = ?̂?(?̂?). 
Hansen (1996) proposes a Likelihood Ratio (LR) test which is a heteroskedasticity–consistent 




                                                                                           (2) 
In order to test for Bhagwati hypothesis, we first check for the existence of trade openness and 
exports thresholds for the relationship between FDI and economic growth. It is important to note 
that, the bootstrap procedure suggested by Hansen (1996) is relied on to ensure asymptotic 
distribution of the LR test statistic. Indeed, the consistency of 𝛾 depends on where it lies within 
the confidence interval (c) which is asymptotic using the 𝐿𝑅𝑛(𝛾) set at ?̂? = {𝛾: 𝐿𝑅𝑛(𝛾) ≤
𝑐}.Under the null hypothesis of no threshold effect, the threshold parameter is not identified and 
this makes the asymptotic distribution of the LR test statistic nonstandard. Here, the null 
hypothesis is rejected for large values of 𝐿𝑅𝑛(𝛾0) in favour of the alternative hypothesis. By 
rejecting the null hypothesis, we find evidence of threshold confirming the Bhagwati hypothesis. 
Once the hypothesis is confirmed, our findings suggest that the link between FDI and economic 
growth is conditioned on the openness. Thus, we proceed to estimate the precise threshold values 
for our threshold variables as well as the impact of FDI on growth. We present the findings in the 
next section. 
 
3.0 Findings and discussions 
This section presents findings of the study where we begin with the test for threshold. Three 
possible outcomes are notable. First, there is a complete Bhagwati hypothesis if we reject the 
null hypothesis for the two different proxies of openness namely trade openness and exports. 
Second, there is incomplete Bhagwati hypothesis if we fail to reject the null hypothesis for either 
trade openness or exports. Third, there is no evidence Bhagwati hypothesis if we do not reject the 
hypothesis for the different measures of openness. Table 1 reports the results of the threshold 
tests.3We find statistically significant threshold estimates for Botswana, Cameroon, Ghana, Mali, 
and South Africa using trade openness as the threshold variable, thus indicating that trade 
openness has a threshold effect in the relationship between FDI and economic growth in these 
countries. This finding suggests that the growth effect of FDI in these countries may be 
contingent on the extent to which the countries are open to trade. Turning to exports, Botswana, 
Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Mali, and Senegal exhibit statistically significant threshold estimates 
and this informs that the impact of FDI on economic growth in these countries may be mediated 
by exports.  
 
 
                                                 
3We do not provide the descriptive statistics of the variables for the countries but are available upon request from the 





Table 1: Testing for existence of threshold 
Countries Time period 
Trade openness as the threshold 
variable 
Exports as the threshold variable 








Benin  1982 – 2018 9.088 0.326 10.984 0.152 
Botswana 1976 – 2018 17.008 0.000*** 14.993 0.008*** 
Burkina Faso 1979 – 2018 9.776 0.376 11.704 0.153 
Cameroon 1977 – 2018 18.554 0.000*** 10.993 0.152 
Cote d'Ivoire 1975 – 2018 8.626 0.5225 11.882 0.100 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 1970 – 2018 8.581 0.663 9.840 0.429 
Equatorial Guinea 1985 – 2018 6.694 0.876 12.811 0.029** 
Ghana 1975 – 2018 12.439 0.092* 13.382 0.046** 
Kenya 1970 – 2018 6.496 0.885 7.987 0.668 
Malawi 1973 – 2018 8.402 0.697 10.495 0.222 
Mali 1971 – 2018 12.204 0.095* 15.068 0.010** 
Mauritius 1977 – 2018 7.723 0.700 8.627 0.529 
Nigeria 1981 – 2018 6.888 0.830 7.459 0.683 
Senegal 1970 – 2018 8.257 0.772 13.660 0.066* 
South Africa 1970 – 2018 13.509 0.050* 12.101 0.114 
Tanzania 1990 – 2018 9.978 0.286 11.393 0.124 
Togo 1980 – 2018 8.695 0.624 9.656 0.466 
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Number of bootstrap 
replications is 2,000. 
In Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Togo, we observe that there are no thresholds of trade 
openness and exports for the relationship between FDI and economic growth due to the absence 
of statistically significant threshold estimates for trade openness and exports. These findings 
suggest that possible discontinuities in the FDI-economic growth relationship in these countries 
cannot be attributed to variations in trade openness and exports. Overall, the results of the 
threshold tests reveal the possibility to test for Bhagwati hypothesis in only Botswana, 
Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Mali, Senegal, and South Africa based on the sample 
splitting approach.  
We proceed to testing for the validity of the Bhagwati hypothesis in Botswana, Cameroon, 
Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Mali, Senegal, and South Africa by examining the impact of FDI on 
economic growth below and above the thresholds. A critical interrogation of Table 1 suggests the 
existence of complete Bhagwati hypothesis for three countries (Botswana, Ghana and Mali), and 
incomplete hypothesis for four countries (Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Senegal and South 
Africa). Thus, for these countries, whether FDI spurs or inhibits economic growth depends on 
whether the countries are operating below or above the estimated threshold value of openness. 
For the remaining countries, there is no evidence to support the Bhagwati hypothesis. Given this 
evidence, we proceed to empirically estimate the impact of FDI on growth for countries where 
6 
 
either complete or incomplete Bhagwati hypothesis is found. Table 2 presents the results of the 
threshold estimation effects.  
The global ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation results show that the linear relationship 
between FDI and economic growth is not statistically significant in all countries, implying that 
FDI neither spur nor retard economic growth of the countries when thresholds of either trade 
openness or exports are ignored. Considering thresholds for the FDI-economic growth 
relationship, we discover that FDI has a negative and statistically insignificant relationship with 
economic growth in Botswana when trade openness is less than the threshold value of 104.85%. 
However, FDI has a negative and statistically significant relationship with economic growth 
above the threshold value of trade openness. The coefficient of FDI above trade openness 
threshold level indicates that a unit-percentage increase in FDI decreases economic growth by 
0.451%. Also, the relationship between FDI and economic growth is positive albeit not 
statistically significant below the exports threshold value of 55.06%. On the contrary, a negative 
and statistically significant relationship exists when the threshold value of exports is surpassed. 
There is a reduction in economic growth by 1.773% as a result of a unit-percentage increase in 
FDI when exports threshold is exceeded. These findings demonstrate that FDI does not influence 
economic growth of Botswana in low regimes of trade openness and exports, but deters 
economic growth in high regimes of trade openness and exports. Thus, Bhagwati hypothesis 
does not hold true for Botswana.   
For Cameroon, FDI has a positive and statistically insignificant relationship with economic 
growth below the trade openness threshold value of 49.321%. However, the FDI-economic 
growth relationship, while still positive, becomes statistically significant when the threshold 
level of trade openness is exceeded.  The coefficient of FDI above trade openness threshold 
indicates that a unit-percentage in FDI enhances economic growth by 1.353%. The relationship 
between FDI and economic growth is positive and not statistically significant below and above 
the exports threshold value of 21.735%. This finding indicates that the nature of relationship 
between FDI and economic growth is consistent at low and high regimes of exports. We show 
for Cameroon that FDI promotes economic growth in high regime of trade openness, but does 
not facilitate economic growth in low regime of trade openness. Thus, we offer evidence to 
validate Bhagwati hypothesis in Cameroon. Only exports is used to identify threshold for the 
FDI-economic growth relationship in Equatorial Guinea. The results show that the exports 
threshold estimate is 89.224%. The relationship between FDI and economic growth is positive 
but not statistically significant below the threshold. Above the threshold, this relationship is 
negative and statistically significant. At any level exceeding the exports threshold, a unit-
percentage increase in FDI causes economic growth to reduce by 0.734%.  We find that FDI fail 
to promote economic growth in Equatorial Guinea at high-exports regime; rather it becomes 
harmful to economic growth. It is therefore apparent that Bhagwati hypothesis is not valid for 
Equatorial Guinea.  
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Threshold variable: Trade openness 
Linear model 
Threshold model: 
Threshold variable: Exports 
Global OLS without 
threshold 
Regime 1 [𝑞𝑖 ≤
𝛾] 
Regime 2  
[𝑞𝑖 > 𝛾] 
Global OLS 
without threshold 
Regime 1  
[𝑞𝑖 ≤ 𝛾] 
Regime 2  
[𝑞𝑖 > 𝛾] 
Botswana 
FDI 0.145(0.115) -0.039(0.322) -0.451(0.233)* 0.126(0.115) 0.211(0.160) -1.773(0.324)*** 
Threshold estimate  104.85%  55.06% 
95% confidence interval  [101.360%, 114.450%]  [54.520%, 55.200%] 
R-squared 0.480 0.500 0.656 0.573 0.718 0.877 
Joint R-squared  0.712  0.792 
Heteroskedasticity test (p–value)                            0.277  0.087 
Cameroon 
FDI 0.073(0.346) 0.068(0.288) 1.353(0.738)* 0.465(0.362) 0.346(0.313) 1.030(0.740) 
Threshold estimate  49.321%  21.735% 
95% confidence interval  [49.321%, 50.281%]  [21.079%, 23.575%] 
R-squared 0.671 0.775 0.741 0.677 0.915 0.684 
Joint R-squared  0.827  0.840 
Heteroskedasticity test (p–value)                            0.414  0.629 
Equatorial Guinea 
FDI    -0.123(0.358) 0.050(0.122) -0.734(0.376)*** 
Threshold estimate    89.224% 
95% confidence interval    [89.224%, 89.224%] 
R-squared    0.384 0.563 0.871 
Joint R-squared    0.840 
Heteroskedasticity test (p–value)   0.782 
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively and standard errors (White corrected for heteroskedasticity) 
















Threshold variable: Trade openness 
Linear model 
Threshold model: 
Threshold variable: Exports 
Global OLS 
without threshold 
Regime 1 [𝑞𝑖 ≤ 𝛾] 
Regime 2  
[𝑞𝑖 > 𝛾] 
Global OLS 
without threshold 
Regime 1  
[𝑞𝑖 ≤ 𝛾] 
Regime 2  
[𝑞𝑖 > 𝛾] 
Ghana 
FDI 0.257(0.172) 33.513(7.899)*** 0.693(0.244)*** 0.232(0.176) -52.250(12.700)*** 0.384(0.162)** 
Threshold estimate  31.750%  10.654% 
95% confidence interval  [22.393%, 31.750%]  [10.654%, 10.654%] 
R-squared 0.327 0.694 0.547 0.319 0.881 0.513 
Joint R-squared  0.671  0.6513 
Heteroskedasticity test (p–value)           0.821  0.965 
Mali 
FDI 0.790(0.574) 13.056(0.543)*** -0.816(2.936) 0.801(0.573) 0.834(2.821) -1.201(1.705) 
Threshold estimate  41.427%  15.810% 
95% confidence interval  [41.427%, 57.829%]  [12.756%, 18.871%] 
R-squared 0.701 0.997 0.278 0.071 0.487 0.118 
Joint R-squared  0.431  0.354 
Heteroskedasticity test (p–value)                           0.000  0.051 
Senegal 
FDI    0.984(0.607) -0.242(0.463) 1.537(0.498)*** 
Threshold estimate    27.315% 
95% confidence interval    [26.100%, 30.866%] 
R-squared    0.113 0.273 0.615 
Joint R-squared    0.457 
Heteroskedasticity test (p–value)   0.083 
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively and standard errors (White corrected for heteroskedasticity) 
















Threshold variable: Trade openness 
Linear model 
Threshold model: 
Threshold variable: Exports 
Global OLS without 
threshold 
Regime 1 [𝑞𝑖 ≤ 𝛾] 
Regime 2  
[𝑞𝑖 > 𝛾] 
Global OLS 
without threshold 
Regime 1  
[𝑞𝑖 ≤ 𝛾] 
Regime 2  
[𝑞𝑖 > 𝛾] 
South Africa 
FDI 0.335(0.293) 1.039(0.303)*** -0.017(0.355)    
Threshold estimate  48.890%    
95% confidence interval  [45.835%, 59.764%]    
R-squared 0.188 0.882 0.169    
Joint R-squared  0.479   
Heteroskedasticity test (p–value)                           0.725   
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively and standard errors (White corrected for heteroskedasticity) 





Shifting attention to Ghana, the results show that the FDI-economic growth relationship is 
positive and statistically significant below and above the trade openness threshold value of 
31.750%.  Below the threshold level of trade openness, the coefficient of FDI indicates that a 
unit-percentage increase in FDI increases economic growth by 33.513%. When trade openness 
exceeds 31.750%, a unit percentage rise in FDI boosts economic growth by a modicum 
percentage of 0.693%. Using exports as the threshold variable, the results show that there is 
dissimilarity in the relationship between FDI and economic growth below and above the 
threshold level. The relationship is negative and statistically significant below the threshold 
level, but positive and statistically significant above the threshold. The FDI coefficient below 
exports threshold indicates that economic growth experiences a huge decline of 52.50% due to a 
unit-percentage increase in FDI. Conversely, above exports threshold, a unit-percentage increase 
in FDI stimulates economic growth by 0.384%. The findings show, on one hand, that the FDI 
plays a growth-promoting role in Ghana at low regime of trade openness, although this role is 
reduced at high regime of trade openness. On the other hand, the findings reveal that FDI 
positively impact on economic growth in Ghana at regime of high exports only. On the basis of 
these findings, Bhagwati hypothesis is rejected for Ghana using trade openness as the threshold 
variable. However, we fail to reject the hypothesis when exports serve as the threshold variable. 
Thus, we provide divergent evidence which suggests that the validity of Bhagwati hypothesis in 
Ghana depends on the level of openness.  
In Mali, a negative and statistically significant relationship subsists between FDI and economic 
growth when trade openness is lesser than the threshold value of 41.427%. However, this 
relationship becomes positive but statistically insignificant above the threshold value. The 
coefficient of FDI in regime 1 of trade openness indicates that a unit-percentage increase in FDI 
leads to 13.056% increase in economic growth when trade openness is not beyond its threshold 
value. With exports as the threshold variable, the results demonstrate that no statistically 
significant relationship subsist between FDI and economic growth below and above the threshold 
value of 15.810%. We establish that FDI hinders economic growth in Mali at low regime of trade 
openness, but economic growth is unaffected by FDI at high trade openness regime. We also 
show that FDI does not have significant implications for economic growth at low- and high-
export regimes. Consequently, evidence to support Bhagwati hypothesis is non-existent for Mali.      
In the case of Senegal, only exports act as the threshold variable. At level below the threshold of 
27.315%, FDI has a statistically significant negative relationship with economic growth. Above 
the threshold level, this relationship is altered and it turns to be positive and statistically 
significant. A unit-percentage rise in FDI fosters economic growth by 1.537% at levels higher 
than the exports threshold. Our findings indicate that the impact of FDI on economic growth in 
Senegal is not felt at low-exports regime; however, FDI promotes economic growth at high-
exports regime. This suggests that Bhagwati hypothesis can be upheld for Senegal. For South 
Africa, only trade openness is relied on as the threshold variable and it has a threshold value of 
48.890%. FDI has a positive and statistically significant relationship with economic growth 
below the threshold. Going beyond the threshold, the relationship between FDI and economic 
growth becomes negative and statistically insignificant. The coefficient of FDI indicates that a 
unit-percentage increase in FDI causes 1.039% increase in economic growth in regime 1 of trade 
openness, provided trade openness is below 48.890%. These findings inform that FDI is only 
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beneficial for economic growth in South Africa in low regime of trade openness, thus implying 
that South Africa does not follow the postulation of Bhagwati hypothesis. 
4.0  Concluding remarks 
Bhagwati hypothesis holds that the overall impact of FDI on economic growth is conditioned on 
countries’ level of integration with the international market. This study re-examines this 
hypothesis by determining the impact of FDI on economic growth conditioned on countries level 
of openness in 17 selected SSA countries. By relying on a sample splitting technique while 
considering the different heterogeneous characteristics of each country, we document three key 
findings: First, there is evidence of complete Bhagwati hypothesis for three countries where both 
trade openness and exports mediate the relationship between FDI and economic growth. Second, 
there is also evidence of incomplete Bhagwati hypothesis for four countries given the measure of 
openness. Third, we do not find support for the hypothesis in majority of the countries. Thus, 
whether the level of openness mediates the relationship between FDI and economic growth 
depends on both the country characteristics and the indicator of openness. In order for countries 
with evidence of complete and incomplete Bhagwati hypothesis to enjoy the growth benefits of 
FDI, we imply from the threshold estimations for policy direction.  It is imperative for Botswana, 
Ghana, Mali and South Africa to ensure that trade openness is kept below the threshold while 
Cameroon should maintain trade openness above the threshold. Similarly, exports should not be 
allowed to exceed the threshold in Botswana and Equatorial Guinea. However, in Ghana and 
Senegal, it would be beneficial to allow exports exceed the threshold. It is important for caution 
to be exercised in Ghana given the conflicting evidence.   
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Fig. 3: Confidence interval for trade openness threshold for Cameroon 
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Fig. 6: Confidence interval for trade openness threshold for Ghana 
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Fig. 8: Confidence interval for trade openness threshold for Mali 
 
 
Fig. 9: Confidence interval for exports threshold for Mali 
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